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Abstract 
The power relations that underlie poverty and exclusion can make or break development programmes, if 
not understood and addressed at all stages of design and implementation. Political economy and power 
analysis represent distinct but complementary approaches to making sense of power in the context of 
development initiatives. Both approaches are used to provide organisations with a better understanding of 
key actors and their interests, and of the enabling and constraining structures, conditions and narratives in 
which their actions take place. These include both observable and less visible norms, institutions and 
discourses, and the formal and informal motivations shaping different actors’ behaviour in supporting or 
blocking change. This article seeks to clarify the similarities and differences between political economy 
and power analysis, what they each can offer, and how they may be used in complementary ways to make 
development cooperation more effective and transformative. 
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Introduction 
Methods of political economy and power analysis are increasingly used by development organisations 
who recognise the importance of understanding context, actors and relationships. Gaining a practical grasp 
of power and political economy in the contexts where they work, it is hoped, will help them to better plan, 
strategize, identify entry points, map actors, foresee pitfalls and opportunities, and lead to better outcomes. 
This interest in power and political economy has generated demand for useful concepts, methods and tools 
of analysis. Donor approaches can be said to fall into two very broad categories, ‘power analysis’ and 
‘political economy analysis’, which offer distinctive but also complementary ways of understanding how 
power operates. Understandably, there is confusion as to what is meant by ‘power’ and ‘political 
economy’ – whether they are the same thing, whether they complement or contradict one another, and 
which is best suited for particular issues or contexts. 
 
This paper seeks to clarify these two broad approaches and to identify their similarities and differences. 
We maintain that while they are ontologically distinct (i.e. based on different meaning systems), they can 
be used in complementary ways. However, their different starting points make it important to surface their 
assumptions about how change happens, rather than simply a ‘mixing methods’.  We identify what each 
approach can and can’t offer, and argue that when used together they can question taken-for-granted 
development narratives. We also suggest that it is useful to ask who should do power or political economy 
analysis, when, and why. 
 
1. Power and political economy analysis compared 
Interest in power and political economy analysis has grown as development donors and civil society actors 
recognise the effects power relations can have on their policies and programmes, and the benefits of solid 
context analysis. While often referred to in the same breath, power and political economy approaches have 
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different ontological, epistemological and disciplinary groundings. As ‘power’ has been famously 
described as an ‘essentially contested’ concept (Lukes 1974, 2005), it is no surprise that these approaches 
view power from different positions. Simply put, political economy analysis explains the behaviour of 
political actions through the lenses of economic institutionalism – applying economic assumptions about 
human behaviour and rational choice to political and institutional behaviour and relationships. The main 
focus is on identifying key actors, their assumed or observed interests, and what helps or hinders their 
cooperation. Structures, norms and ‘rules of the game’ that shape their behaviour are also considered. In 
contrast, power analysis is informed by critical theory, anthropology, political sociology and feminist 
theory. It gives greater attention to the influence of socialised and internalised norms on behaviour, and to 
the interplay between agency and structure. Both approaches, in different ways, seek to unpack the more 
and less visible dimensions of power and relationships that facilitate or block change.  
 
The image of an iceberg is a useful analogy for what these two traditions offer, and where they overlap 
and complement one another. Political economy tends to focus on actors, structures and processes that are 
visible and ‘above the waterline’, as well as what may lie half-hidden under the surface such as informal 
norms, institutions and relationships. Power analysis is concerned with less visible social norms, beliefs 
and structures well ‘below the water line’, as well as half-hidden patterns near the surface that shape 
actors’ behaviour and relationships. By combining these perspectives, we can gain a more complete and 
systemic view of how power operates across the spectrum of these different levels. This we argue can 
provide a more robust analysis that surfaces assumptions, exposing blind spots and unquestioned 
narratives. But to do this, we need to understand these different lenses, and what they do and don’t 
perceive. 
 
Image 1: Power and political economy analysis: looking above and below the waterline 
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2. What is political economy analysis? 
Political economy analysis (PEA) is broadly defined as a ‘methodology of economics applied to the 
analysis of political behaviour and institutions’ (Weingast and Wittman 2006). This broad definition 
includes both a set concepts and frameworks that looks at the intersection between economics and politics 
as a unique field of study (Barnett, Hinich and Schofield 1993), but also as a methodology that uses 
economic institutionalism as well as historical and institutional analysis to understand political dynamics 
(Alt and Shepsle 1990; North 1990). 
 
The contemporary use of PEA could be traced back to the 1950s when political scientists systematically 
used instruments of economic analysis to better understand political cooperation dilemmas, the 
competition for electoral votes, the distribution of scarce resources, the advancement of political careers, 
and the formation of coalitions to cite a few examples (Arrow 1951; Downs 1957; Riker 1962; Mayhew 
1974; Ostrom 1990). After the 1990s, the next generation of PEA significantly revolutionised the 
understanding of political dynamics especially to understand legislative politics, budget politics, electoral 
dynamics, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, fiscal and monetary policies, international relations, ethnic 
conflict, decentralisation, democratisation, etc. (Barnett et al. 1993, Weingast and Wittman 2006). 
 
PEA permeated the thinking and practice of many bilateral and multilateral development agencies as early 
as the 1990s (Burki and Perry 1998). Several agencies including DFID, GIZ, USAID and parts of the UN 
followed suit in subsequent years with different tools and instruments to understand ‘Poverty and Social 
Impact Analysis’, ‘Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis’, ‘drivers of change’ or 
‘political settlements’ (Booth, Crook, Gyimah-Boadi, Killick and Luckham with Boateng 2005, Booth, 
Cammack, Harrigan, Kanyongolo, Mataure and Ngwira 2006; Di John and Putzel 2009; Leftwick, 2010; 
Khan, 2012; Routley and Hulme 2013). Although the detail and methodology has varied, the primary 
focus of PEA is on actors, networks, institutions and their competing interests. PEA can incorporate 
varying levels of analysis – macro (country context), meso (policy implementation) and micro (policy 
impact) (Haider and Rao 2010: 4); and be done with different audiences in mind, including rigorous 
academic assessments, country practice guides and rapid assessments (Reich and Balarajan 2012). 
 
Common features of political economy analysis 
A complete survey of the common elements and methodologies that define PEA is not possible here. 
However, some of the underlying features include: 
 
Institutions matter. There is an explicit recognition that norms and structures matter to shape individual 
behaviour and indirectly development (policy) outcomes (North 1990). Institutions are taken as given 
“rules of the game” that set out the context, motivations and sanctions in which strategic individuals make 
choices. While early versions of PEA focused on given formal governance and economic structures, 
contemporary approaches consider how: 
 
a. Both formal and informal institutions are embedded in social and historical contexts that shape 
behaviour (Helmke and Levitsky 2006).  
b. Institutions tend to reproduce power asymmetries, as they reflect the preferences and interests of 
influential actors (Moe 2005).  
c. Institutions change over time (…) (Levitsky and Murillo 2009).  
  
Individuals matter. For the most part, PEA tends to focus on individuals or agents as the main unit of 
analysis (i.e. mayors, presidents, bureaucrats, citizens). An underlying premise is that political behaviour 
tends to reflect for the most part, the best interests of such individuals, given their legal, economic and 
social constraints, however there are some important revisions to keep in mind: 
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a. The best interest of individuals does not only include material benefits or rewards.  The search for 
the common good or even altruistic behaviour can be modelled as furthering the best interest of an 
individual; 
b. The notion of best interest will change with context and over time; for example, individuals tend 
to have different attitudes towards taking risks when they are relatively wealthier than when they 
are poorer (Bernstein 1996); 
c. Actors are not always individuals but sometimes they represent a collection of like-minded 
individuals with similar interests (i.e. a political party or an association of municipalities, or 
institutional interests such as the military). 
 
Commitment matters. Political economy analyses pay special attention to understanding the motivations 
of individuals to cooperate (or not) over time. A critical part of reinforcing commitment is the role of 
‘third party enforcers’, to help cement agreements, legitimize decisions, and uphold (enforce) agreements 
(Scartascini, Spiller, Stein and Tommasi.2008).  
a. These commitment devices can take the form of actors, rules or ‘currencies’ (i.e. money, prestige, 
material goods)  
b. These enforcers could be reflected in a formal institution (e.g. the judiciary or a Supreme Court) 
or an ‘informal’ institution (e.g. a council of tribal chiefs). 
 
Advantages and limitations of political economy analysis  
The main advantage of using PEA in a development setting is that it seeks to understand the behaviour of 
key actors not in a moral, normative or ideal fashion but rather in terms of strategic responses to existing 
norms and structures. For example, the act of paying a bribe in exchange for a service may be a survival 
response in the culture of corruption and deficient government services. Another advantage is the explicit 
recognition of the intersecting space between the formal rules of the game and the informal practices of 
actors on the ground. Furthermore, PEA could be used to understand the political institutions and 
dynamics operating at different stages of the policy process (formulation, approval, implementation, 
monitoring) to identify entry points for donor intervention. For example, citizen participation efforts are 
usually geared towards helping policy formulation or monitoring execution, but rarely for overseeing the 
process of legislative adoption.  
 
There are some limitations of PEA that need to be taken into account. First, a political economy analysis 
will be of limited use unless there is an articulation of a specific theory of change associated to the 
expected development initiative. In other words, it would be difficult to identify the main actors, 
institutions and drivers of change unless there is an explicit discussion of how change takes place and why 
and when this is more likely to happen. It is useful to ask for example, ‘Why should politicians care about 
child malnutrition?’ ‘Who are local politicians accountable to?’ ‘Why –and when – do people mobilise to 
demand regime change?’ Note that PEA does not tend to ask how institutions or norms change – rather 
who will support or oppose these reforms and who the ‘drivers’ are likely to be.  
 
A second limitation is that PEAs require a significant degree of background work and adaptation to the 
specific context if the analysis is to produce useful insights into the relevant actors, norms and dynamics. 
Usually sector-specific PEAs can yield important information about the politics behind a concrete 
development initiative, but this would in turn need to be informed by a national level analysis of political 
dynamics. For example, a PEA of water management can look at the relevant actors and networks around 
the local provision of safe and clean water, but it will need to be complemented or informed by the 
dynamics and motivations to deliver public services of the main political parties at the national level.  
 
In addition to the significant time of analysis and level of expertise, a comprehensive PEA needs constant 
updating to reflect changing factors in the development context. The specific validity and practical 
 
 
  5 
 
relevance of a PEA depends on how the analysis is able to incorporate changes due to external shocks (i.e. 
natural disasters and emergency situations), domestic factors (i.e. after elections) or international factors 
(i.e. changes in donors’ spending priorities). While a PEA will not be able to anticipate these factors or 
their consequences, it should provide the analytical elements so that development practitioners can adjust 
the main findings of PEA according to new developments. For example, the validity of a PEA explaining 
the politics of effective and transparent service delivery in municipal governments may change after 
holding local elections; in this case, the motivations and priorities of some elected mayors may change, 
but the imperative for improved service delivery, the institutions of municipal decentralisation and the 
available fiscal resources will remain the same. 
 
3. What is power analysis? 
Power analysis (PA) is a general term used to describe the approaches used by development and social 
change actors to better understand the ways in which different dimensions of power act to reinforce or 
reduce poverty and marginalisation and to identify actors, entry points and positive forms of power that 
can be mobilised in favour of desired changes. Power analysis has multidisciplinary roots, drawing 
broadly on the fields of social theory, politics, political sociology, anthropology and feminist theory. It 
complements the strong actor- and organisation orientation of PEA by giving greater attention to the role 
of socialised and structural dimensions of power, how these may enable and constrain actors, and how 
they change. PA is a method of context analysis that articulates a theory of change and identifies strategies 
that may be effective; it has mostly been used to develop a country strategy or design a programme or 
sector strategy, but has also been used in mid-term reviews, evaluations and learning processes.i 
 
Common features of power analysis 
Power Analysis draws on a range of concepts and frameworks that explore both the formal and 
observable, and the informal and less visible dimensions of power. A commonly used framework is the 
notion that power may take ‘visible’, ‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ forms (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002; Gaventa 
2006), building on the concept of ‘three dimensional power’ (Lukes 1974, 2005). This framework 
distinguishes between the formal and observable exercise of power (visible), power or bias that is 
exercised from behind the scenes (hidden), and hegemonic norms and beliefs that secure consent to 
domination (invisible).  
 
Power is often understood simplistically as ‘power over’ –forms of authority, control or domination. This 
may take the form of brute domination, but it can also operate by constraining what others think they can 
do or even imagine as possible. ‘Power over’, like ‘invisible power’, extends beyond physical or verbal 
forms of domination to affecting the ways in which people view themselves and their rights and 
capabilities.  
 
For example, Gramsci’s hegemony describes how people are persuaded to do things that are against their 
own best interests (Gramsci 1971). They come to accept the claims of elites that the pursuit of their own 
interests coincides with a general interest. Ideals and norms are ‘hegemonic’ if they hold people in their 
sway, remain unquestioned and come to be viewed as ‘common sense’. Gender analysis offers a similar 
framing of power: the idea that women cannot do certain jobs because of physical inadequacies or that 
women make better parents than men has been hegemonic at certain points in history, and in certain 
contexts. PA draws on frameworks of empowerment to identify the positive ‘expressions of power’ that 
may be needed to counter hegemony, such as the idea that less powerful people can develop ‘power to, 
power with and power within’ (Rowlands 1997; VeneKlasen and Miller 2002):  
 
 ‘Power to’ is agency or the ability to act and can begin with the awareness that it is possible to 
act; it can grow in the process of taking action and realising that one can effect change, as well as 
through developing skills and capacities. 
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 ‘Power with’ describes collective action, and includes both the psychological and physical power 
that comes from being united and acting together to resist domination.  
 
 ‘Power within’ describes the sense of confidence, dignity and self-esteem that comes from 
gaining awareness of one’s situation and realising the possibility to do something about it.  
 
These ‘expressions of power’ or agency are reminders that power can be used positively as well as 
negatively, by the disempowered as well as the powerful. The concepts are often used together: people 
need ‘power within’ in order to act, and ‘power to’ to act collectively; to ‘power with’ of shared 
understanding and action can also strengthen self-esteem and agency (Veneklasen and Miller 2002). 
 
Advantages and limitations of power analysis 
Advantages. Learning about power, and analysing context and interventions with a power lens can help 
development actors develop sensitivities and competencies that enable them to act in ways that will shift 
these relations and to empower marginalised people. Like PE, power analysis is used to deepen contextual 
and structural understandings of the national and regional situations in which an organisation works, as 
well as the global actors and forces that influence this local context. Its value added is to identify enablers 
and constraints related to people’s aspirations and cultural norms that may affect an intervention – for 
example creating participatory spaces may not work if people cannot imagine having control over their 
lives. Programme staff and partners can use power analysis to anticipate responses and prevent their 
programmes from being blocked or co-opted by powerful interests, and to identify entry points they may 
not have considered.  
 
Power analysis can also identify possible perverse consequences, as when poverty reduction or post-
conflict reconstruction programmes empower wealthy people or warlord factions, rather than people living 
in poverty. Power analysis can be a means of building the knowledge and competencies needed by staff 
and partners to work effectively within complex, unequal and fast-changing environments. Power analysis 
can also help those working in development to reflect on their own positions as political actors, both 
personally and institutionally, and to become more aware of how to handle the power dynamics of their 
relationships. This dimension is often missing from context analysis. 
 
Limitations. Power analysis does require a certain level of understanding of and ability to apply key 
concepts of structure and agency, which typically reach beyond the quick identification of actors, their 
interests and networks. It can require some time and practice to use, and if staff or consultants are not 
familiar with them, they may be used in more superficial and limited ways. The emphasis on sociological 
and ideological context and structure can also divert attention away from the practical analysis of actors, 
their interests and relationships – ‘losing sight of the trees for the wood’. For this reason we find it 
practical to emphasise the complementarity between different approaches. 
 
4. Political Economy and Power Analysis combined 
Power and political economy analysis both seek to explain how some individuals or groups behave toward 
and seek to control others, how consent to such control is secured and maintained, and what enables or 
prevents actors from cooperating with one another. An agency perspective sees power as something that 
people and institutions can hold, wield, lose and gain, usually through political or military alliances or 
contestations. It is concerned with the interests and motivations of actors, and drives their ways of relating 
to one another. A structure perspective sees power as the social and cultural norms and beliefs that are 
unconsciously internalised and that shape, often invisibly, people’s thoughts and actions. Power is 
embedded in all relationships, institutions and systems of knowledge, and is part of the way our societies 
and cultures work. These understandings of power often form the basis of a theory of society, which looks 
not only at actors and relationships but at how social norms and structures are created, reproduced and 
transformed. 
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A useful entry point for combining the analysis of power, particularly in political decision-making and 
democratic participation, is to look at three ‘dimensions’ or ‘faces’ of power (Lukes 1974, 2005, Gaventa 
2006, VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). As noted above, the typology moves from the visible power of 
formal decision making processes, to the hidden power of organised biases and agenda-setting behind the 
scenes, to the invisible power of forces that shape people’s consciousness and felt needs.  
 
In practice, the three types of power will overlap. However, it is important to combine the visible and 
hidden or informal dimensions of power with the underlying cultural and social norms and practices in 
order to identify how development changes take place. The following table offers a systematic guide to 
compare how the political economy and power analysis frameworks can better understand the different 
dimensions of power.  
 
Table 1. A Three-way comparison of political economy and power analysis 
 Political Economy              Power Analysis 
Main dimensions of power  Visible Hidden Invisible 
The role of institutions 
/rules of the game 
For the most part, 
institutions are taken as 
given or they are hard to 
change in the short run 
Emphasis on informal 
institutions, often resilient 
to change  
Focus on “structuration” – 
interplay between 
conscious agency and 
internalisation of norms 
Examples of institutions Formal government and 
NG institutions (mayors, 
cabinets, NGOs); existing 
norms and regulations 
Informal institutions 
(traditional governance 
structures, militias) 
Social institutions (gender 
norms, ethnic identity etc.) 
and networks (kinship, 
political solidarity) 
The role of individuals Individual, rational action. 
Organiztaional action 
Combine individual and 
collective actions through 
networks 
Focus on individual and 
collective consciousness 
(shaped by different 
factors) 
Cooperation and 
contestation 
Collective action is the 
result of individual 
motivations 
Collective action results 
from individual 
motivations and social 
norms 
Collective action results 
from social and cultural 
norms 
Sanctions and enforcement Formal (legal) ways to 
legitimize agreements 
(contracts) or sanction 
defections 
Informal sanctions outside 
formal legal norms, such 
as bribery or coercion 
Fear of exclusion or loss of 
identity; internalised social 
norms 
How they explain change 
over time? (key drivers of 
change) 
Types of actors, 
preferences and strategies 
change but institutional 
change is much slower 
(“Change from above”?) 
Greater trust in agency to 
change power relations. 
(“Change from below”?) 
Changes in critical 
awareness and sense of 
empowerment leading to 
growth in agency 
(“Change from within”?) 
Example: how to ensure 
effective service delivery 
from local governments? 
What are the legal, 
political, and financial 
resources allocated to local 
governments? 
Who performs local 
government functions in 
practice? Power operates 
‘behind the scenes’.  
Who is neglected from 
local governments or does 
not benefit from delivery 
of services, and why? 
Sample recommendations 
emerging from analysis 
Influence policymaking 
through political advocacy 
and seeking access to 
formal decision-making  
strengthen and empower 
organisations, build 
collective leadership, raise 
the visibility of issues, 
mobilize new voices  
Raise consciousness to 
transform the way people 
perceive themselves and 
those around them 
 
The common features of political economy and power analysis 
It is useful to disaggregate the key elements of political economy and power analysis, in order to see what 
each perspective contributes to understanding them. Here we consider four key elements that shape power 
relations, but there are certainly others: 
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 Formal and visible structures, institutions and rules of the game 
 Informal and invisible structures, norms, beliefs and narratives 
 Actors, their interests and strategies 
 Processes of cooperation and contestation 
 
For each element of analysis we describe what aspects are considered by political economy or power 
analysis, and suggest some guiding questions to further explore these complex manifestations of power in 
an applied setting. 
 
Structures, institutions and rules of the game  
 
Formal power can be thought of as the visible, recognised structures of power that are part of the way in 
which societies work: institutions that mediate the relationship between those with legitimate authority 
and those who are subject to that authority, the laws and rules that define what is acceptable and what is 
not acceptable, and how those who break laws and flout norms are treated. There are several decades of 
work around institutional analysis looking at a) ‘how institutions work’, b) the expected behavioural 
effects and resulting outcomes, and c) sources of endogenous change (who shapes those institutions in the 
first place?). Over the past two decades, there has been renewed attention at the less visible or legally 
recognised ways through which norms, rules and behaviour are regulated, sometimes through informal, 
illegal or clandestine forms of coercion. Taken together, this set of institutions form part of ‘the rules of 
the game’, or the set of clearly defined norms and rules that are accepted, communicated and enforced 
through formal and informal channels. 
 
The notion of ‘the rules of the game’ closely defines the arenas or spaces in which power and political 
dynamics take place. Conversely, it could be said that power relations in different arenas are shaped by 
different rules of the game. A powercube framework has been developed to analyse the ownership and 
inclusiveness of different spaces of public deliberation and decision-making (Gaventa 2006).ii According 
to the framework, decision making can take place in closed, invited or claimed spaces. Spaces are closed 
when they limit the opportunities for inclusion outside established procedures (e.g. council member 
meetings include members previously elected for that role but not others). Spaces are invited when 
citizens can permeate decision-making bodies to voice their concerns (e.g. public consultations); such 
spaces are usually established by authorities for citizen participation. Finally, spaces are created or 
claimed when actors create alternative arenas for engagement and action (e.g. alliances, street protests). 
By looking at different arenas and the rules that shape them, the analysis can identify ‘political 
opportunity structures’ or entry points to effectively influence decision making.  
 
Importantly, the notion of spaces looks beyond actors and their assumed interests and relative power, and 
considers the ways in which power may operate in these points of interaction. The power relations 
between actors will be shaped by the rules and norms (visible, hidden and invisible) that determine access 
to spaces, accepted ways of behaving and speaking within them, and how agenda-setting and decision-
making are governed. Spaces underscore the extent to which power is fluid, temporal and contextual 
rather than fixed. 
 
Key questions: 
 
 What are the formal existing institutions (legal frameworks, norms, regulations) defining the rules 
of the game? 
o Are these rules stable over time or predictable? 
o Are they legitimised or widely accepted? 
o Are they effectively applied? If not, why? 
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 What are the existing practices that define how the game is actually played?  
o Do these rules seek to expand, complement, or contradict the existing formal rules of the 
game? 
o Are these rules stable over time or predictable? 
o Are they legitimised or widely accepted? 
Are they effectively applied? If not, why? 
 
 Who participated in drafting the rules of the game? At what point in time where these rules 
decided? 
o Do the rules represent the views, values or interests of a particular group? 
 
Invisible norms, discourses and narratives 
 
Informal power can be thought of as the socialised norms, discourses and cultural practices that are part of 
our everyday lives. Informal power relations are internalised through socialisation from a young age, 
starting with acceptance of inequality in roles, for instance, between father and mother and older and 
younger family members, or boys and girls. These informal power relations are often taken for granted as 
given, or natural. Because deliberate strategies of coercion or domination are not required, informal power 
is sometimes also referred to as ‘invisible’ power (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002; Gaventa 2006) or the 
‘third dimension’ of power (Lukes 1974, 2005). The distinction between formal and informal power is 
useful in drawing attention to the fact that changes in formal and visible structures or strategies of 
domination are necessary, but not sufficient to transform societies and make them more equitable. Laws 
may precede and indeed hasten social change, but to be effective they need to be accompanied by efforts 
to change socialised norms, attitudes and values. 
 
Much social theory focuses on these less visible and culturally embedded forms of power to explain how 
social norms, hierarchies and patterns of behaviour are automatically reproduced and resistant to change. 
Some focus on the deliberate strategies and actions of powerful actors to manipulate the consciousness 
and felt needs of less powerful actors (eg. Lukes 1974, 2005). Others explain this not as a result of 
intentional ‘agency’ or even of deterministic ‘structures’, but as a kind of continuous and unconscious 
interplay between agency and structure – where power is understood as the norms, discourses and 
behaviour that are socialised and internalised by all actors (eg. Bourdieu 1980; Foucault 1991; Hayward 
2000).  
 
Key questions: 
 
 What are the predominant identities? 
o How are these identities shaped and reproduced by social and cultural norms?  
o How do they influence political and judicial structures and processes? 
o How do people’s self-perceptions of their identities either reinforce or challenge 
prevailing social and cultural norms? 
o How do these identities shape different values or discourses?  
 
 How are different narratives built into common development discourses? 
o Do these discourses contribute to reinforcing social hierarchies or exclusion? 
o How do these narratives build on beliefs, norms and cultural practices legitimise and 
reinforce material power structures? 
o Are these narratives used to advance reforms or legitimise the status quo? 
 
Actors, interests and strategies 
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Both political economy and power analysis recognise the role of agency in producing policy changes, and 
the fact that these actors are bound or limited by existing formal or informal power relations. The focus on 
actors seeks to identify if the relevant players have the capacity to produce meaningful development 
changes. Strictly speaking however, it is important to distinguish who are the critical or veto players 
without whom policy changes could not take place, and the other players who are important but not 
decisive for producing changes. A second important distinction is that the relevant veto players are not 
always visible or fully mobilised that are nevertheless present in the development process. Finally, critical 
actors tend to be identified with individuals or organisations (presidents, mayors, municipalities, NGOs). 
However in practice, it is relevant to disaggregate who the critical actors are, and whether it is safe to 
assume that a collective body (e.g. municipality) is represented by a single actor (e.g. the mayor) or there 
is greater complexity within (e.g. a diverse group of municipal council members). 
 
Once the key development actors have been identified, the next step is to establish what are their powers, 
roles and responsibilities. Again, their role may already be defined by the formal and legal institutions or 
structures (e.g. a mayor), or by traditional norms (a council chief). Yet this description should be different 
from analysing the actual motivations and interests to fulfil their expected roles, independent of their 
formal obligations (e.g. a mayor may be directly accountable to his/her party leaders, rather than the will 
of the voters).  
 
In sum, some of the relevant questions to keep in mind when analysing actors and interests are: 
 
 Who are the main actors involved?  
o Who is decisive to produce development changes? 
o Who is present but not decisive? 
o Who is decisive but not present or (not yet) mobilised? 
 
 What are the prerogatives, attributions, responsibilities of these actors? 
o Who established these roles? 
 
 What are the motivations of these actors to fulfil their responsibilities?  
o What are their preferences, interests, strategies?  
o What do they really do in practice? 
 
Cooperation and contestation  
 
The question of what makes actors cooperate with one another or not, is probably one of the most decisive 
pieces of the analysis to understand what kind of development changes can take place. Yet an answer to 
this question cannot be fully articulated until there is clarity on the formal and informal rules, and the 
interests and motivations of actors. Over time, political science has invested heavily understanding the 
logic of collective action. Simply put, joint or cooperative action is likely to take place when: a) there are 
fewer individuals (who can keep track of one another’s actions), b) individuals have converging interests 
along the same dimension or issue, c) individuals tend to share longer time horizons, and d) there are 
credible enforcement mechanisms to ensure cooperation. By contrast, it follows that larger groups of 
individuals with diverse interests or backgrounds, who have short-term interests and mistrust one another 
are unlikely to produce cooperation. 
 
Needless to say, not all forms of cooperation are formalised, long term or ideological. It is often the case 
that temporary alliances (or alignments of interests) take place around specific agreements at one given 
point in time. It is also the case that different clusters of actors can form rotating or changing coalitions. 
These are all valid forms of cooperation, they are unlikely to lead to sustained or even continuous 
development changes over time. 
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Some of the relevant questions to keep in mind when analysing actors and interests are: 
 
 What are the actors’ motivations to cooperate with one another?  
o Is it duty, tradition, self-interest? 
o Is it short term or long term interest? 
 
 What makes cooperation possible? 
o Is it formal agreements, informal pacts or material exchanges? 
o Do existing institutions facilitate cooperation? 
 
 How do actors ensure cooperation? 
o What happens if/when actors abandon their agreements? 
(a) Are there any explicit rules, formal agreements or informal pacts to ensure 
cooperation?  
 
5. Application: developing a shared theory of change  
One of the most common questions that comes up when applying political economy, power analysis, or a 
mix of the two, is how can these make a difference in practice. There is no shortage of analyses that had 
no impact whatsoever on design and implementation, let alone monitoring and evaluation although more 
research is needed to document this empirically (Routley and Hulme 2013). There are also strong 
institutional inertias within donor agencies that make it difficult to accept and act upon PEA 
recommendations to implement effective reforms on the field (Routley and Hulme 2013). From a country 
office perspective, the challenge is to avoid the cost of hiring regular consultants to update or develop 
sector specific PEAs for every new intervention.  
 
One concrete way forward is for country offices to develop a common understanding of a programme’s 
theory of change, given the existing stakeholders, motivations, institutions and limitations highlighted by 
the country’s PEA. The idea is to develop a political baseline that explains how power and power relations 
operate in a given policy sector, who are the main allies and opponents to a proposed policy change, what 
are the potential coalitions for change, and most important of all, to develop a clear idea of what would 
effective and practical policy change would look like. Based on this shared understanding of power 
dynamics, the country office’s staff should be able to develop accurate objectives, strategies, entry points, 
activities, outcomes and indicators that respond to the analysis.  
 
We suggest that in many cases a combined political economy and power analysis will lead to a more 
robust, multi-perspective theory of change. By looking at power from different angles and assumptions, 
making these viewpoints explicit and comparing them, the analysis will be more likely to identify decisive 
actors, rules and underlying social dynamics. It should then be possible to articulate an explicit 
understanding of a) the goals or objectives of a specific development initiative, and b) the causal and 
contextual factors that are most conducive to achieving that goal. Recent studies and systematic reviews 
around transparency and accountability initiatives have found that there is little or in-depth analysis of 
what ‘meaningful change’ looks like in this development field (McGee and Gaventa 2013). A related 
concern is the lack of a ‘theory based’ approach to project development and evaluation that explains ‘the 
implicit assumptions, logic and mechanisms behind complex development interventions (…) 
contribut[ing] to a better understanding of the causal/impact chains’ (McGee and Gaventa 2013, White 
2010). This section addresses both issues.  
 
Identifying the notion of “success” 
The use of political economy and power analysis is likely to yield accurate policy recommendations if 
there is a clear and practical definition of the expected outcome of a development initiative. If we take for 
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example current initiatives around accountability and transparency, it becomes clear that a simple 
definition of ‘success’ is obscured by the confusion of whether transparency and accountability are ‘means 
to an end’ or ‘ends’ in themselves (Mejía Acosta 2013; McGee and Gaventa 2013). In the first case, 
existing development interventions could be more explicit about what the expected impact of 
‘accountability’ is supposed to achieve, namely improved service delivery or increased citizen 
participation. But if ‘improved citizen participation’ appears as an expected outcome, it would be useful to 
theorise and explain key questions such as ‘which citizens it refers to’, whether they were ‘active prior to 
the creation of the mechanism’, ‘where they get their information’, ‘how they act upon it’, ‘on which 
issues they mobilise’, and ‘whether they are well-behaved or antagonistic toward state institutions’, to cite 
a few (McGee and Gaventa 2011). An in-depth understanding of what constitutes a ‘successful’ 
development initiative is a key step for identifying the sequence of factors leading to that goal. 
 
Sometimes, development initiatives are correct in pursuing a higher-end and explicit long-term 
development goal, but failed to make explicit the immediate short-term changes needed to achieve longer-
term impact. Even in these cases, an explicit discussion of the proximate or intermediate objectives would 
be useful to identify and operational notion of ‘meaningful change’, as well as the sequence of necessary 
steps leading to it. 
 
How does change happen? 
A key feature of political economy and power analysis, combined, is that it offers a systematic way for 
understanding the key stakeholders, norms, discourses and power dynamics contributing to (or 
continuously blocking) the attainment of meaningful change. Assuming there is a clearly defined notion of 
meaningful change such as the improvement in the delivery of public services, the specialised literature 
tends to assume a causal connection that begins with citizens’ awareness (i.e. to improved information), 
towards articulating citizens’ voice (i.e. through formal and informal institutions), and increasing the 
responsiveness of service providers (i.e. establishing clear sanctions when public servants fail to do their 
job) (Joshi 2011: 6). While the causal link between accountability and improved service delivery may be 
intuitive to development practitioners, ‘this chain of causation is seldom explicitly examined’ in existing 
development initiatives aimed at increasing transparency and amplifying voice (McGee and Gaventa 
2011). 
 
A first step towards identifying how change happens would entail an identification of the key decisive 
actors or veto players (whose consent is needed to adopt new policy changes), what are the commonly 
shared interests and motivations, and the existing institutions, norms and arenas that facilitate these 
changes (Tsebelis 2001). In this context, identifying the relevant ‘drivers of change’ and the 
corresponding coalitions for change constitute key steps to understanding how can meaningful changes 
take place.  
 
But identifying an expected – even if preliminary – theory of change, could also be useful to understand 
why change does not happen or why changes are systematically blocked and by whom. Rarely in 
development, and in public policy in general, do policy changes take place in a linear, incremental way. 
More often, political economy and power analysis can be used to explain why development changes have 
not taken place or why the motivations of actors do not change over time. Depending on the case, key 
actors would have incentives to block reforms if these go against their vested interests. In practical terms, 
a systematic stakeholder mapping of drivers and blockers, enablers and spoilers, would allow the 
identification of ‘bottlenecks’ in the reform process, that is, critical situations or arenas where there is no 
visible agreement and a policy stalemate ensues; another example is the presence of ‘glass ceilings’ or 
stages in the reform process beyond which any meaningful change is no longer possible due to the 
presence of vested interests. Equally, the analysis may show how accepted social norms and behaviours 
perpetuate the problems despite successes in the policy sphere – pointing to the need for other kinds of 
initiatives, such as working with the media, culture or social movements. 
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In sum, we argue that existing development initiatives for the most part, are not underpinned by a clear 
articulation of exactly what outcome or impact is sought, or of how the actions and inputs contemplated 
are expected to generate that outcome or impact (McGee and Gaventa 2011). A combined political 
economy and power analysis can help to surface and sharpen this vision. The following guiding questions 
seek to address that gap and help practitioners to identify key elements in the process of change. 
 
Key questions: 
 
 When and how is change likely to happen (or not)? 
o Who are the critical actors needed to produce meaningful changes? 
o Are there any actors not present or that could be mobilised more effectively? 
o What are the possible coalitions of change? What holds these coalitions together? 
o What are the arenas, norms and structures enabling (or blocking change)? 
o What are the ‘bottlenecks’ to reform? What are the glass ceilings? 
 
Entry points for cooperation 
If properly done, a combined political economy and power analysis framework, or a menu of approaches 
drawing from both traditions, would help development practitioners to identify the national level and 
sector specific context in which proposed interventions are likely to work. The analysis should also help 
identify the decisive actors for producing meaningful change as well as those blocking it, to articulate 
more clearly what the possible coalitions for reform are. It would also identify the informal and invisible 
power dynamics that block change, or that could be mobilised to enable change. But perhaps most 
important of all, the combined framework or menu would offer an analytical map of the sector or domain 
to inform the discussion (amongst development actors) of where lie the key entry points for a successful 
cooperation and where are the perceived risks. 
 
A useful consideration in this regard for example, is to distinguish whether the same actors play different 
roles and have different entry points in the policy process to facilitate or block meaningful change. Taking 
for example the role of municipal mayors in participatory budgeting, it is often assumed that local 
authorities can greatly benefit from enhancing citizens participation in budget formulation. However, a 
broader discussion of relevant actors and dynamics throughout the budget process will show that mayors 
lack the technical competencies to demand scarce government funds from the central government, 
including the Executive and the Ministry of Finance. In this example, any cooperation funding to support 
participatory budgeting will be incomplete unless the motivations, capabilities and political alignments of 
mayors vis-à-vis the central government is taken into account. 
 
Some guiding questions from the combined framework include: 
 
 What would a ‘successful’ donor or organisational strategy or programme look like? 
o Who are the key actors that can maximise initiatives? Which actors could potentially 
block the desired change? 
o Who are the key actors that have not yet been identified, mobilised or could be better 
supported? 
o What are the assumed spaces of interaction, and could more be done to create new spaces, 
formal or informal, or to change the culture of existing spaces? 
 
 Where and when are the opportunities for change and reform? 
o At which point in the policy process can meaningful change take place? What are the 
entry points and sequences of intervention that may be needed? 
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o What complementary strategies may be required, beyond the conventional ones? (e.g. to 
address visible, hidden and invisible power) 
o Are staff and partners well-prepared to support meaningful change (financially, 
technically, politically)? 
 
6. Ways forward for a combined approach 
The combined or complementary approach to political economy and power analysis is an effort to 
combine different analytical and methodological traditions to better understand political and power 
dynamics facilitating or blocking development interventions. The very act of combining and comparing 
different standpoints on power and political economy can lead to a more robust and explicit analysis. 
There are several ways in which this work can be and will be strengthened in the near future. 
 
Conceptually, we need to further refine and combine the different frameworks to identify the ways in 
which alternative, context-relevant development narratives can be created and embedded around particular 
interventions to boost or hinder prevailing development discourses. Importantly, there is a need to 
recognise the inherent tensions as well as complementarities: political economy and power analysis are 
rooted in different disciplines, with distinct ontological and epistemological underpinnings that are not 
always compatible. Applied alone, each tradition is likely to neglect certain dimensions of power; and 
combined too simplistically, there are risks that important concepts will be only partially understood or 
weakly applied within the framing of a single set of assumptions. Inter-disciplinary work is essential in 
this regard. 
 
Empirically, we need to further develop survey, interview, observation and other instruments to 
adequately capture, in quantitative and qualitative terms, the different actors, interests, norms, institutions 
and change coalitions. We will continue to develop practical tools and frameworks for applying these 
concepts in complementary ways within cooperation processes (many do exist and are being tested with 
SDC, Sida and other organisations). An important lesson emerging from such efforts is that the concepts, 
lenses and tools of political economy and power analysis can best be integrated in a selective way into 
existing processes and instruments, rather than burdening over-worked staff with yet another requirement. 
The analysis can be applied in light and insightful ways at all stages of a cooperation cycle, rather than as 
a single ex ante exercise; more work for example is needed to integrate political economy and power 
analysis into evaluation and outcome measurement (McGee and Pettit 2013). 
 
Practically, there is a need to work collaboratively to develop training and capacity development 
resources and sessions to teach and validate these approaches working closely diverse organisations and at 
different levels. For example, more efforts could be made to integrate power analysis frameworks and 
tools into political economy training and guidelines, and vice versa. There is also a need to develop more 
participatory and multi-stakeholder approaches which can allow partner organisations to develop shared 
analyses, theories of change, strategies, and evaluation frameworks which consider the multiple, context-
specific dimensions of power. Further involvement could include programme-specific accompaniment, 
action learning, assessments and practical capacity development workshops with organisations and their 
partners. Applied, experiential learning approaches can be a vital complement to more formal training.  
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i The IDS has been documenting and innovating with various methods of power analysis over the past decade 
through its work with Sida (e.g. Pettit 2013), SDC (this article), DFID and a number of international NGOs and civil 
society organisations worldwide. In the UK this work has been developed into practical methodological guidelines 
for use by grassroots organisations (Hunjan and Pettit 2011) (Pettit 2012).   
ii See also www.powercube.net.  
